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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES B. PETTY, MAGGIE C. 
PETTY, RACHEL P. LUNT, 
NORMA P. STRASSER, UTAHNA 
P. BELNAP, LEILA P. SHIPP, 
NEUMAN C. PETTY, JOHN K. 
RUSSELL, Trustee, and HOW ARD 
0. MILLER, Trustee, Partners of 
PETTY INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a partnership doing business in the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
GINDY MANUFACTURING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10274 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action of promissory estoppel by the 
above-named partners of a finance and investment 
firm doing business in Utah as Petty Investment 
Company (R. 38) against Gindy Manufacturing 
C(Jrporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation to recover 
a monry judgment originally in the sum of $13,-
000.00, interest and costs. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The ~as: was ~ried t~ th_e court. ~rom a judg. 
ment of d1sm1ssal with preJud1ce of Plamtiff's action 
the Plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decree dismiss-
ing with prejudice the Plaintif's causes of action 
' and a decree of this Honorable Court of judgment 
for the Plaintiff against the Defendant, or failing 
in that an order of this Honorable Court for a new 
trial of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's action was begun on June 21, 1963 
by service of summons upon one, G. H. Mickelson 
as Defendant's agent, the so-called Defendant's "Dis· 
tributor" of Gindy Trailers. On the same day the 
sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah attached a trailer 
manufactured and owned by Defendant Gindy Man-
ufacturing Company and in the possession of the so-
called "Distributor" or his personally owned corpo· 
ration, Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., as a demon· 
strator. 
A special appearance and motion to quash the 
service of summons was made by the Defendant. 
Upon pre-trial hearing the motion to quash the s.erv· 
ice of summons was granted and the Court retamed 
jurisdiction of the said trailer, Model C240V9. (R. 
38.) 
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On May 22, 1963 after due proceedings under 
Rule 64 C (f) an order was entered releasing said 
trailer from attachment upon Defendant having filed 
with the Court a corporate undertaking of Fireman's 
Insurance Company in the amount of fifty-five hun-
dred ($5,500.00) dollars (R. 48). 
Therefore according to the proceedings in the 
trial court the action is now an in rem action, and 
the Plaintiff's position is that it is an action based 
upon the modern doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
The material facts are stated, it is believed, 
objectively. Plaintiffs have not, however, viewed the 
facts favorably to the findings of the trial court 
which viewed the pleadings merely as stating an ac-
tion of deceit and in the alternative of a legal condi-
tional contract. 
The material facts are stated as a court of equity 
iB free to weigh the evidence in the light of an equit-
able action of promissory estoppel. 
Meuning and Use of Words and Phrases 
The surname Petty as used herein will mean 
Charles B. Petty in his capacity as agent and man-
aging partner for the Plaintiffs doing business as 
Petty Investment Company. (R. 91, 12-15.) 
The name Gindy will be used to mean Gindy 
Manufacturing Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corpo-
ration, the Defendant. 
The surname Mickelson will be used herein to 
indicate Glen H. Mickelson in his capacity as Presi-
4 
dent, and managing agent of Freeway Trailer Sales 
Inc., a Utah corporation (R. 88) of which he wa~ 
principal stockholder (R. 30) until its charter was 
suspended on October 14, 1963 for failure to pay 
corporate tax (Ex. 3). When the name Mickelson 
is used to apply in his individual capacity or as prin-
ciple stockholder, manager and agent of one of his 
other corporations, namely, Intermountain Leasing 
Corporation, special mention of such fact will be 
given. ( R. 30.) 
The phrase Freeway Sales will be used to indi-
cate Mickelson's corporation, Freeway Trailer Sales, 
Inc. which has lost its franchise (Ex. 3) and has no 
assets ( R. 48, 24-26). 
(a) The Factual Requirements of Promissory 
Estoppel 
The multiplicity and complexity of factual re-
quirements of an action of promissory estoppel indi-
cate that a mere chronological statement of facts will 
not be most helpful. Clarity, it seems, will be greatly 
aided by grouping the material fact situations under 
group headings which have evolved in drawing the 
lines of demarcation between, situations where legal 
rules of contract should be applied, and the fact sit-
uations which fulfill the requirements of an action 
of promissory estoppel - "a contract in the eye of 
equity." 
The factual requirements for this relatively new 
contract cause of action have developed very rapidly 
since the masterful statement of Section 90 of the 
Restatement of Contracts about 34 years ago, under 
5 
the heading "Informal contracts without Assent or 
Consideration." 
The facts generally must be fitted into said 
section 90 which reads : 
A promise which the promissor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial charac-
ter on the part of the promisee and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is binding 
if injustice can be avoided only by the enforce-
ment of the promise. 
By June, 1941 there were at least 46 appellate 
decisions interpreting Section 90. ( 114 Ill. L. R. 187-
204, 190.) In classifying the facts in this case, coun-
sel will seek to assemble the facts in groupings as 
follows: 
First, the special facts of the case other than 
those in the Milne and the first Interstate so-called 
orders for Gindy semi-trailers, claimed by Gindy to 
be discovered to be fraudulent or forged. In this 
group, facts will be examined to determine whether 
Mickelson, personally acted as an independent con-
tractor of Gindy, or whether by continuous course 
of dealing Freeway sales became and acted as the 
soliciting agent of Gindy. 
This first group of facts rests on the principle 
declared in Ravino v. Price ( 1953) 123 Utah 559, 
570, 260 P. 2d 270 and emphasized in Easton v. Wy-
coff (1956) 4 Utah 2d 368, 389, 295 P. 2d 332, as 
controlling. 
6 
The quote from the Rrrvino case is as follows: 
Application of the rules of equitable en-
forcement must to a considerable extent be 
governed by the circumstances of each case. 
( 570.) 
Second, the additional facts will be grouped un- ' 
der one of the six factual requirements summarized 
as essential for an action of promissory estoppel com-
ing within the general terms of section 90 of the 
Restatement, supra. These respective groups of facts 
are stated by Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 5th ed. 
1941, Vol. 3, Secs. 805 as follows: 
1. There must be conduct - acts, Ian- , 
guage, or silence - amounting to a represen-
tation or concealment of a material fact. 
2. The facts must be known to the party 
estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at 
least the circumstances must be such that 
knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to 
him. (Exception Sec. 809.) 
3. The truth concerning these facts must 
be unknown to the other party claiming the 
benefit of the estoppel, at the time when sue~ 
conduct was done, and at the time when 11 
was acted upon by him. 
4. The conduct must be done with t~e 
intention or at least the expectation, that it 
will be a~ted upon by the ot~e~ party, or und.e1; 
such circumstances that it is both natma 
and probable that it will be so acted upon. 
5. The conduct must be relied upon by 
the other party, and thus relying he must be 
led to act upon it. 
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6. He must in fact act upon it in such a 
manner as to change his position for the 
worse; in other words, he must so act that 
he would suffer a loss if he were compelled 
to surrender or forego or alter what he has 
done by reason of the first party being per-
mitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert 
rights in consistent with it. 
It will be seen that fraud is not given as 
an essential requisite in the foregoing state-
ment. It is not absolutely necessary that the 
conduct mentioned in the first subdivision 
should be done with an actual and fraudulent 
intention of deceiving the other party; nor is 
this meaning implied by any of the language 
which I have used. 
Third, this final grouping of facts will cover 
the alleged so-called orders, by which Gindy claims 
to be defrauded by its agent Freeway Sales into be-
lieving it had genuine orders and therefore innocent-
ly misrepresented to plaintiffs that the Milne and 
first Interstate orders were thought by Gindy to be 
genuine. The facts in these two supposed orders 
raises the question of which of two innocent parties 
must suffer the loss. 
(b) The Background "Circumstances of This 
Case." 
Plaintiffs through Petty as the managing part-
ner of Petty Investment Company (R. 91, 12) made 
a first loan to Mickelson of $24,000 on May 31, 1961 
(R. 93) due in 60 days ( R. 94). Apparently the first 
note was paid by a later note to Plaintiffs which 
increased the amount loaned to $35,000, also due 
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in '61 in 60 days after date ( R. 94). In answering 
whether the second note was to Mickelson personallv 
or to his corporation Freeway Sales, Petty answered,: 
A. Well they are so closely interrelated 
A. I think it was Freeway (R. 94). 
The second loan was only partly repaid appar-
ently $19,400 remained over-due on September 28, 
1962 ( R. 94) . A second mortgage had been given 
to secure the second note. In attempting to collect 
the second note it was discovered that the mortgage 
description was on ground owned by others and 1 
Plaintiffs "were obliged to release it." (R. 95.) 
This was the strained situation when on the 
morning of September 28, 1962 Mr. Mickelson came 
to Petty with an offer of assignment of "commis· 
1 
sions coming" ( R. 97) . 
Mr. Mickelson orally represented to Mr. Petty 
that Freeway Trailer Sales Inc. wanted to borrow 1 
$12,000. That it had commissions due and coming 
due of $44,300 on orders held by Gindy which Free-
way Trailer Sales, Inc. would warrant to be genuine 
(Ex. 5) ( R. 97). Mr. Petty refused to rely on Mick-
elson's representations. Plaintiffs w o u I d loan 
$12, 000 of new credit (a) only if Plaintiffs would 
definitely receive that amount plus another $5,000 
on the old past-due debt from G indy direct and. (b) 
only if Gindy would represent to Plaintiffs di'.·ect 
that it had orders from Freeway Sales and/or Mick· 
elson on September 28, 1962 out of which the $17,000 
9 
would be paid by Gintly to Petty Investment Com-
pany ( R. 97). 
Petty testified that he then sent a telegram to 
Gindy inquiring if he could rely on payment of 
$17,000 if he made a further loan to Freeway Trail-
e1· Sales, Inc. ( R. 99) . 
At this time Petty did not know whether Gindy 
had the orders represented by Mickelson, and second 
whether the fact was that the orders were genuine 
for at least $17,000 of commissions to Freeway Sales 
and/or Mickelson. Petty's lack of knowledge was the 
same when two days later, on Monday morning 
September 30 the $12,000 of new loan to Freeway 
Trailer Sales, Inc. as payee was made. (Ex. 4) This 
is the factual requirement of promissory estoppel 
numbered 3 by Pomeroy, supra, p. 191. 
Factual Relations of Gindy and Mickelson Person-
nl/y ond Freeway Sales By Continuous Course of 
Dealing 
Prior to September 28, 1962, namely on March 
1, 1962, Mickelson and Gindy mutually executed 
what was designated as a ''DISTRIBUTOR" con-
tract (Ex. 2). However G indy allowed only one abor-
tive attempt by Mickelson to purport to buy a Gindy 
:'emi-trailer for resale, ( R. 128) to be hereafter de-
scribed. All of the orders and so-called orders (Ex. 
6 & 7) read on page 2 thereof "Sold by Freeway 
Trailer Sales, Inc." except No. 3903, the Earl Morri-
son order, which reads, "Sold by G. H. Mickelson 
(Freeway Trailer) (Ex. 6). 
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The testimony on the meaning of Mickelson'i 
personal signature on Exhibit 2 shows his intention 
at the time of signing the same. 
Q. Will you state what that document 
is? 
A. It is a dealer's agreement between 
Gindy Manufacturing and Freeway Trailer 
Sales (R. 87, 7-9). 
Correspondence in evidence is between Fref'-
way Sales and Gindy not with Mickelson personally 
(Ex. 7 p. 1, Letter July 1, 1962, information of pos-
sible customer for Gindy, that Pacific & Atlantic 
Shippers, a division of P. I. E. are in the market for 
"250" trailers for their Piggy-back operation and 
suggesting sample semi-trailer be leased at $100 per 
month.) 
When Mickelson advertised Gindy semi-trailers 
in the yellow pages of the 1962 telephone book 
he had the ad read: "WHERE TO BUY THEM" 
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., 2110 S. 3 W. - HU 4-
8711. 
The assignment of commissions of $44,300 to 
Petty Investment Company is by Freeway Trailer 
Sales, Inc. addressed to Gindy Sept. 28, 1962 (Ex. 5). 
The check of Petty Investment Company corer-
ing the new loan of $12,000 dated 9/30/1962 is to 
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. as payee. 
The telegram from Gindy to Plaintiffs repre-
sent orders held from Freeway and/or G. H. Mickel· 
11 
son presently to produce in the future more than 
$17,000. 
The f Ol'egoing facts compel the inference of 
fact that Mickelson did not act as distributor - an 
independent contractor buying Gindy semi-trailers 
for resale - but that Freeway Sales was the solicit-
ing agent for Gindy at all times from March 1962 
to September 30, 1962 by a continuous course of 
dealing to act for Gindy as follows: 
(1) To solicit customers investigating semi-
trailers. (Ex. 7, p. 1, Letter.) 
( 2) To solicit prospective customers' names 
and their negotiating specifications for probable later 
order of Gindy Trailers; (Ex. 6, No. 3902, Peebles, 
Pillsbury neither cash or time price shown (R. 115-
121). To be financed at Bank of America in Los 
Angeles ( R. 119). 
( 3) To solicit orders for cash (Ex. 6, No. 3903, 
Morrison) or for cash and exchange of used trailers 
(Ex. 6, No. 3909, Interstate Motor Lines 20-40 ft. 
trailers, and, 
( 4) To solicit conditional offers for the leasing 
of Gindy trailers conditioned on agreement of satis-
factory financing of prospective customers by Gindy 
or usually by a bank approved by Gindy (Robert 
.J. Orr, Intermountain Leasing Corp.) Ex. 6, No. 
8900, to be financed at Bank of America (R. 132). 
( d) Gindy' s Special order Method of Operation 
knd Petty's State of Mind 
12 
Unknown to Plaintiff's Gindy did not conduct 
its business through Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. hv 1 
having its agent secure orders for stock semi-trailei·; , 
such as are shown on the last two pages of Exhibit 
7 - "PIGGY-BACK TRAILERS FOR NATION-
AL CARLOADING CORP. SPECIFICATIONS." ' 
Mr. Stanley Walters, Jr., the treasurer of Gin<ly 
(R. 28) apparently was manager of Gindy, subject 
to constant checking with Mr. Ginsburg, the "owner ' 
of Gindy'' (R. 109). Among Mr. Walter's many 
duties was to price out the 40 odd specifications 1 
designated by a prospective customer on the nego- .i 
tiating specifications of so-called Gindy orders (Ex. 
6) which contained the name of the prospective cus-
tomer. Only after this was done, and only after the 
prospective customer had been informed of and had 
agreed to Gindy's offer of the cash price or the time 1 
price while he was free to shop around in a highly 
competitive market for Freuhauf or Williamson or 
many other trailers (see yellow page advertisement, 
R. 29) was a firm order had by Gindy. It was also ) 
one of Mr. Walter's duties to check the credit of pro-
spective customers and to negotiate for financing, 1 
another condition precedent before a time price order 
was had by Gindy (R. 119 & 116). It was also Mr. 
1 
Walter's duty to negotiate lease arrangements, on ' 
so-called orders where only the specifications oc-
curred and the prospective customer had not signed. 
(R. 131, 26.) 
Mr. Walters testified: 
13 
. We do not build stock trailers. We 
build customer trailers to customer specifica-
tions and quite often at the time the order is 
signed it is not possible to determine the price 
(R. 129, 6-9). 
Because of the way in which Gindy operated, 
different than the selling of stock automobiles or 
trncks, he used the word orders in a different sense 
than the vehicular industry understands its mean-
ing. 
In this regard the damaging admission of Mr. 
Walters appears as follows: 
Q. When you said "commissions?" 
A. When I said "on deals in or pend-
ing?" (Italics added.) 
Q. Which did you say deals in or pend-
ing? 
A. I don't remember which word I used 
now .... 
Q. No difference in your mind between 
orders or deals? 
A. I might use the word interchange-
ably. 
These facts fulfill Pomeroy's requirement num-
bered 2, supra. Gindy knew, or the circumstances 
were such that knowledge was imputed to Gindy 
(except on the fictitious Milne and 1st Interstate 
orders) that Gindy did not have orders from Free-
way Sales and/or Mickelson which would more than 
cover $17,000 as stated in Walter's telegram to 
Petty Investment Company on September 28, 1962 
(Ex. 1). 
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Petty Familiar With the Word "Order" and Phrase 
"Deals in Process" 
It is a historical fact widely advertised, of which 
we presume the Court will take judicial notice that 
Mr. Charles B. Petty is interested in Petty Motor 
Company or Petty-Ford (R. 92) which is the oldest 
Ford franchised dealer in Utah, and that Petty Ford 
sells stock cars of which there are several models of 
Ford cars. The dealers allow customers to make spec-
ifications of horsepower of engine, kind of trans-
mission, and a number of lesser specifications like 
tinted glass and whitewall tires which must be 
priced before an offer is had. 
In refusing to rely on Mickelson's representa-
tions as manager of Trailer Sales of commissions 
coming of $44,300 (Ex. 5). Petty requested a repre-
sentation of fact from Gindy by telegram and also 
through Mickelson's Freeway telephone calls to Gin-
dy. The request was for information on a question 
of fact: did Gindy have on hand now orders, not 
deals, which would produce at least $17,000 of com· 
missions and would Gindy pay directly to Plaintiffs 
without paying anyone else until Plaintiffs were 
first paid the sum of $17,000 of such commissionsf 
The request was for a fact and a promise based on 
the fact on which Plaintiffs could rely to make a 
substantial change of position. The admissions of 
Mr. Walters regarding two telephone calls, alth~ugh 
scanty, are loaded with inferences of fact. Gmdy 
learned that Plaintiffs would not rely on Freeway 
Sales' assignment of $44,300 of alleged commissions 
15 
coming to support a new loan to Freeway Sales. Gin-
dy learned that Mr. Petty wanted the "orders" (word 
used in telegram Ex. 1) separated from the "Deals 
in Process," (the phrase used in Ex. 5) . 
Mr. Walters testified regarding Plaintiffs re-
quest for a representation of fact on which Plain-
tiffs could rely in making a substantial loan of money 
to Freeway Sales as follows: 
We had two phone calls on the day of 
the telegram, to Mr. Ginsburg, the owner of 
the company. The initial phone call was Mr. 
Mickelson and direct to Mr. Ginsburg - per-
taining to this matter. It was referred to me. 
A second phone call was made presumably after 
conyersation with Mr. Petty, and as a result of the 
second phone call the telegram was sent ( R. 109). 
Q. Did you not take part in the first 
telephone conversation? 
A. I did. He (Mickelson) called Mr. 
Ginsburg and talked about an assignment of 
these earnings - these commissions by the 
distributors' accounts, we called them, if we 
would accept one, etc., and so on. Mr. Gins-
burg told him he would have to take the whole 
matter up with me. My office at that time 
adjoined Mr. Ginsburg's (R. 110). 
Q. Did any of you know Mr. Petty was 
planning to loan this man $12,000.00 when 
he called? 
A. No, I knew he was thinking of loan-
ing him $17,000 when he called. 
Q. You t h o u g h t seventeen and not 
twelve? 
A. That is what I was told (R. 121). 
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These facts make out Pomeroy's requirement 
numbered 4, supra. The representation was made 
"with the intention, or at least with the expectation 
that it would be acted upon" and as Restatement of 
Contracts Sec. 90 supra phrases the needed fact as 
a promissory situation which "the promissor should 
reasonably expect to induce action." 
The Facts Pertaining to The Representation of Fact 
Associated with Integrated Promise Reasonably E:i:-
pected to Induce Action 
Mr. Walters was asked why he sent the tele· 
gram of September 26, 1962 to Petty Investment 
Company. He replied: 
A. That was the fact exactly as they were 
understood ( R. 14 7, 19) . (Italics added.) 
Mr. Petty was asked if he received the reply 
from Gindy to his telegram of a request for a state· 
met of whether orders were held by Gindy on which 
at least $17,000 of commissions would later be paid. 
A. Yes, Promptly, - very promptly (R 
98, 21). 
The telegram of representation and promise of 
September 28, 1962 (Ex. 1) addressed to Petty In· 
vestment reads as follows: 
Will withhold first seventeen thousand 
dollars in commissions to Freeway and/or 
Mickelson for payment to you. They have suf~ 
ficient orders in or pending to more than covei 
this. 
Gindy Mfr. Corp. 
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E. Walters Jr. Treasurer. (Ex. 1.) 
Let us examine the facts of this telegram in 
the light of its surrounding circumstances. 
Petty had once before increased a loan from 
$~4, 043 to Mickelson ( R. 93) to a loan of $35, 000 
to Mickelson's corporation, Freeway Sales ( R. 91). 
That extension of credit was done only because a 
second mortgage was given as security for more than 
the $11,000 increase in the loan. Petty was burned 
by reliance on Mickelson's representations as to the 
security. It was discovered that Mickelson had given 
a mortgage on ground that he did not own, and the 
mortgage had to be released ( R. 95) . 
Mr. Petty's state of mind on September 28, 1962 
when Mickelson came to him on that Saturday morn-
ing of September 28, 1962 was not to throw good 
money after bad. Nineteen thousand four hundred 
remained past due on the old '61 debt of $35,000 
(R. 94). 
Mickelson represented to Petty on that day that 
he woukl assign to him the commissions on "Deals 
in Progress" due and to become due to Freeway Trail-
er Sales, Inc., of $44,300. (ADDENDUM "A," Ex. 
5). The factual condition of Mr. Petty's mind was 
that he would not trust Mickelson's representations. 
His mind was not interested in "deals in progress." 
There would be no additional loan unless he could 
get a representation from Gindy that it had orders, 
not deals in progress which might result in orders, 
producing $17,000 commissions. Petty's mind be-
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lieved that out of $44,300 commissions on deals in 
progress there ought to be $17,000 commission~ 
earned to be paid when delivery was had on tru1 
orders pending, because of work done from March 
1, 1962 to September 28, 1962 by Freeway Sales. 
Mr. Petty requested that assurance from Cindy 
by telegram ( R. 97). Mickelson wanted desperate!; 
to secure a new loan of $12,000. With Mr. Petti~ 
knowledge and assent, Mickelson acting on beh~li 
of himself and Plaintiffs made the first telephone 
call to Ginsburg, owner of Gindy, and Walters, its 
treasurer. 
The substance of that call was that he (Mickel-
son) "talked about an assignment of these earniugs 
- these commissions by the distributor's accounts, 
we called them, if we would accept one, etc., and so 
on." (R. 110, 18-21.) (Italics added.) Mr. Walter~ 
testified further regarding the purpose of the first 
phone call from Mickelson thus: 
To find out if he would accept an assign· 
ment - if he could arrange this assignment, 
would we accept it? (R. 110, 25-26.) 
Then after that call Mr. Petty and Mr. Mickel-
son held a further conference. It is a necessary in· 
ference of fact that Mr. Petty would not loan any 
monies on a mere acknowledgement of an assignment 
of commissions earned and to be earned in the future 
on Mickelson's assignment of estimated $44,300 of 
commissions on "Deals in Progress" (Ex. 5). The 
facts warranting this finding are supported by the 
following evidence : 
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A second call was necessary to inform Gindy 
that the telegram must be to Petty Investment Com-
pany, that it must not be in terms merely an acknowl-
edgment or acceptance of Freeway's assignment. 
It must, by its terms represent that Freeway Trail-
er Sales, Inc., had at least $17,000 of commissions 
coming on bona fide orders in Gindy's hands, not 
probable commissions on "deals in progress." This 
fact is made evident by the absence of any reference 
to an assignment in the telegram and Mr. Walter's 
testimony about the second telephone call. 
. . . A second phone call was made pre-
1:m ma bly after conversation with Mr. Petty, 
and as a result of the second phone call the 
telegram was sent (R. 109). (Italics added.) 
Another necessary inference of fact regarding 
the talk between Mickelson and Petty just prior to 
the second telephone call is that Mr. Petty made 
clear to Gindy through Mickelson's second phone call 
that what Petty wanted in the telegram was four 
things: 
(a) The telegram must be addressed to Petty 
Investment Company. 
(b) It must state that there are enough "or-
ders," not "deals in process" to assure later payment 
of $17,000. 
( c) It must represent that Gindy does not now 
ha\'e any claims against Freeway or Mickelson which 
would require prior payment of part or all of those 
~17,000 of commissions to any person ahead of Plain-
tiffs. 
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( d) It must show a willingness to make prior-
ity of payment to Plaintiffs without any necessity 
of controversy later on or litigation in Pennsylvania 
to realize on such promise. 
Mr. Walters was not directly asked, why the 
telegram did not ref er to the talk of assignment, or 
why the telegram did not state that commissions 
would be paid only if earned later on "deals in proc-
ess," which were, according to Walters' testimony 
supra., the gist of the first conversation. 
However, Mr. Walters did testify as follows: 
Q. Why did you send it to Petty Invest-
ment Company? 
A. That was the fact - exactly as the!J 
were understood. (Italics added.) 
Q. It wasn't a fact they were commis-
sions, was it? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. You told me they were distributor's 
accounts. 
A. I told you the heading on the gener-
al ledger was Discounts (R. 147). 
The "telegram" fulfills Pomeroy's factual re-
quirements numbered 1, supra., also stated in the 
Ravino case ( 572) supra, of representation of and 
or concealment of material facts. Affirmatively, 
Gindy represented to Plaintiffs that the facts were 
that "they" (Freeway and/or Mickelson) "hare ~u~; 
ficient orders in or pending to more than cover th1~. 
(Meaning $17,000 in commissions and the promise 
to pay those commissions to Plaintiff.) 
Bu"'l.-er'.s or 
PrO.spect ire 
Custorner's 
Name 
Orvil Milne 
1st Interstate 
Order 
Date oi Order 
or So-called 
Order 
J\T a)· 16, -62 
May 18, -62 
Robert J. Orr June 12, .62 
Ten semi-trailers 
Freeway for Pa- July 16, -62 
cific & Atlantic 
Shippers 
Peebles Trucking July 18, -62 
Company, In-
creased 3 to 6 
trailers Sept. 6, -62 
Earl Morrison Aug. 8, -62 
1 semi-trailer 
Interstate Motor Sept. 25, -62 
Lines 20 semi-
trailers 
Capital Trucking No date given 
Company 50 
semi-trailers 
No. n( Order 
or So-calle<J 
Order 
No. 3915 
No. 3914 
No. 3900 
(Ex. 6) 
Letter 
No. 3902 
(Ex. 6) 
No. 3903 
(Ex. 6) 
No. 3909 
No number 
Status or Order 
or So~called 
Order 
Claimed forged 
R. 128 
Represertation 
as Orde1· T'rue 
or Fal~f· 
False ( R. 136, 
137) 
Comrr1ent 
(Ex. G) 
Suggestion of 
sample trailer 
Wholly fictitious False (R. 136) Built but 
Time price 
stated, no 
financing 
agreement 
No. Price 
7 month & no 
financing 
agreement 
(R.119) 
No price (R. 121) 
Time price 
specified, 
note accepted 
Price with 
exchange of 20 
used semi's 
Letter only 
signed by 
Mickelson 
False (R. 131, 
132) 
False (R. 142, 
143) 
False (R. 119, 
121, 126) 
True a Firm 
Order (R. 135, 
138) 
True (R. 130, 
Ex. 6) 
Interstate denied 
ordering 
Multiple leasing 
deal 
Never billed 
(Ex. 7) 
Peebles bought 
elsewhere (R. 
119) commission 
earned 
Gindy cancelled 
without legal 
justification 
This true order 
filled as agreed 
Status Unknown Testimony 
(R. 138) Incomplete 
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The telegram also indicated by its phraseology 
that the state of mind of Gindy by its managing of-
ficers was "in the language of Restatement of Con-
tracts, Sec. 90 to induce action ... of a definite and 
substantial character on the part of the promisee." 
The Facts About the Orders and the Non-Order 
"DEALS IN PROCESS" (See Chart page 21.) 
A thorough examination of the testimony of .Mr. 
Walters shows the facts regarding the truth or fals-
ity of the representation in the telegram that Free-
way and/or Mickelson "have sufficient orders in or 
pending to more than cover $17,000 which Gindy 
promised to pay to Plaintiffs direct with priority 
over all others. The facts prove 2 orders, two fic-
titious orders and the rest are merely "Deals in Proc-
ess" in various stages of negotiations with prosprc-
tive customers who had placed no order and were 
still free to purchase in the competitive market. 
Reliance by Petty on Representation of Fact by Gi11-
dy and on Gindy's Accompanying Promise, and 
Plaintiff's Action of Definite and Substantial Char-
acter Done Upon Such Reliance 
The dominating facts are a representation in-
tended to produce action by another of equitable e~­
forcement and reliance, and action thereon of a def~­
nite and substantial character done upon such reli-
ance. That such reliance and action thereon was 
induced by Defendant's telegram appears patently 
beyond question in this case. All parties are agreed 
on this point. The record finds no dissent. 
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Q. I will ask you Mr. Petty, if you placed 
any reliance upon the telegram, Exhibit 1? 
A. Complete reliance (R. 101, 5). 
The trial court observed in granting Defendant's 
motion to dismiss Plaintif's second cause of action 
sounding in contract as follows: 
THE COURT: ... I am not questioning 
your reliance. Your evidence is ample on that, 
but I see no proof it was false ( R. 107). 
Even counsel for Defendant admitted Plaintiff's 
reliance on said telegram Exhibit 1, in briefly argu-
ing his motion for dismissal of Plaintiff's contract 
action. 
MR. PIKE : . . . In the first place the 
telegram dated 9-28-62, which is relied on by 
the plaintiff, is just not a contract in and of 
itself. Aside from the Statute of Frauds, and 
others, it does not set forth all of the terms of 
any mutual agreement (R. 106). (Italics 
added.) 
It recites no consideration flowing back to the per-
son who is supposedly to be collecting it, and in fair-
ness, I do not think it can logically construe as a con-
tract or agreement in any sense, other than in the 
assignment sense (R. 106-107). 
It is painfully apparent that Mr. Pike did not 
have in mind any of the hundreds of cases that have 
been decided under Section 90 of the Restatement 
of Contracts, Section 90, - "Informal Contracts 
Without Assent or Consideration." 
That the Plaintiffs did take definite and sub-
stantial action in "changing their position for the 
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worse" by reason of such reliance is also beyond ques-
tion. Plaintiffs in reliance on said telegram did loan 
to Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., $12,000 (R. 89 and 
90, 100 and Ex. 4). 
A further fact is that Defendants did pay to 
Plaintiffs $4,000 (R. 101 on February 13, 1963 R. 
149) claiming that $4,000 was the total commission 
earned by Freeway Sales on a sale of 20 semi-trailers 
to Interstate Truck Lines at a price of $144,200 (R. 
130, Ex. 6, No. 3909) and also claiming $4,000 to be 
the total commissions earned by Freeway Sales. 
Michelson represented that all commissions were 
earned by Freeway Sales, none by himself individual-
ly. (Ex. 5.) This was not disputed. Apparently Free-
way Sales understood that its commission on this 
sale would be $17,500. (See: Ex. 5 ADDENDUM 
A.) The trial court thought this alleged total corn· 
mission of only $4,000 on a transaction paying Cin-
dy $144,200 was out of line (R. 130, 14-15). 
Michelson's understanding that Freeway's corn· 
mission on the Interstate order should have been 
$17,500 on a sale of $144,200 seems reasonable in 
view of Mr. Walter's testimony that Freeway's corn· 
mission on the Robert J. Orr Deal (had it become an 
order) "would have been 23 or 25 thousand dollars" 
(R. 113, 24) on a total sale price of $179,520 (R. 
114 and particularly R. 116, 1 7-19) . The Orr deal 
like the Peebles deal never became an order, because 
of the delay of Gindy to work out satisfactory fi· 
nancing for the time price deal. 
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Fact of Cindy's Recognition of Some Indirect Bene-
fit to Hai1e Plaintiffs Further Finance Freeway 
.Tmiler Sales, Inc. 
There is no evidence in the Record of Gindy ever 
assisting Freeway Sales with financing. However 
Cindy was pleased and desirous of having Plaintiff's 
finance Freeway Sales in its operations for Gindy's 
benefit. 
The realization by Gindy, the representor, that 
it would receive some indirect benefit by having Pet-
ty Investment Company further finance its agent 
Freeway Trailer Sales Inc., by making a substantial 
loan to it is evidenced by the following testimony 
of Mr. Walters (R. 121-122): 
Q. When did you become aware of Mr. 
Mickelson's financial difficulties, Mr. Wal-
ters? 
A. Well it was common knowledge Mick-
elson had financial problems as long as I can 
remember. 
Q. And you knew that when Mr. Petty 
called, didn't you? (Italics added.) 
A. Sure. 
Q. And you knew Mr. Petty was plan-
ning to loan this man $12,000 when he called 
you, didn't you? 
A. No. I knew he was thinking of loan-
ing him $17,000 when he called (R. 121). 
Q. This would have been an advantage 
to your company wouldn't it, to have these 
finances loaned to Mr. Mickelson at this time? 
(R. 121-122.) 
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A. Not particularly. 
Q. You knew he was in financial dis-
t~ess and ~hat he had a number of transac. 
t~ons pendmg for your company, isn't that 
right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So certainly you wanted to see him 
succeed? 
A. That's correct ( R. 122). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A 
PART OF FINDING NUMBERED "1," THAT 
MICKELSON WAS A FRANCHISED DEALER 
OF DEFENDANT ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1962, 
AND ACTED ONLY IN A PERSONAL CAPAC· 
ITY IN REQUESTING EXHIBIT "l," THE 
TELEGRAM FROM GINDY, AND ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT SUCH REQUEST 
WAS MADE BY FREEWAY TRAILER SALES, 
INC., A UT AH CORPORATION FOR ITSELF 
AND FOR PETTY INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A UTAH PARTNERSHIP AND THAT FREE· 
WAY WAS THE SOLICITING AGENT OF DE· 
FENDANT FROM MARCH 1, 1962 UNTIL MAY 
18, 1963, BY CONTINUOUS COURSE OF DEAL· 
ING. 
The earlier statement of facts under the head· 
ing of Factual Relations of Gindy and Mickelson 
personally and of Gindy and Freeway Trailer Sales 
Inc., by continuous course of dealing disclosed that 
• 
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Mr. Mickelson signed his name to Exhibit 2 intend-
ing that the rights under it were to be exercised by 
freeway Sales. It also discloses that all other docu-
ments introduced as evidence Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 6, and 
7, which show Freeway Sales as the acting agent. 
When Plaintiff's attorney asked Walters wheth-
er Mickelson was Gindy's distributor the reply was 
that he might have been but was not allowed to oper-
ate in that manner. ( R. 123, and 145.) 
Mr. Walters made it clear that the agreement 
of March 1, 1962, would have allowed Mr. Mickel-
son to operate as a distributor had he been sufficient-
ly financed so that in fact he could operate in that 
manner ( R. 128). 
Q. And doesn't that agreement (Ex. 2) 
provide that he purchase trailers, or he sells 
trailers and then purchase them from Gindy 
to meet sales he makes? 
A. I believe that provides that (sic ?) 
can be a billing directly, or through the dealer. 
In a deal such as Peebles (Ex. 6, No. 3902) 
you are questioning about his financing. We 
have no middleman in terms of endorsing or 
anything else ( R. 123) .... 
However there was only one billing of a semi-
tl'ailer to Mickelson. The trailer was supposed to be 
going to Milne Trucking Lines (Ex. 6, No. 3915) 
which supposed order turned out later not to be or-
dered by Orvil Milne. Someone had taken the liberty 
of signing Milne's name as Milme ( m not n on forged 
signature) without any authority (R. 129). 
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The attempt to deal with Mickelson proved abor-
tive. (Ex. 6, No. 3915 shows "Sold by Freeway Trail-
er Sales, Inc." by shipping to Freeway Sales or Mick-
elson, record not clear on this point.) 
Mickelson had a concession from us in 
mid-August. We billed him and then the in-
voice went unpaid for a substantial period of 
time. We contacted Milne Truck to determine 
why, and he denied he had the trailer or ever 
ordered it ( R. 128). 
There was, however, no intent to put title in 
Mickelson to said trailer. For when Plaintiffs at-
tached the trailer, Gindy swore that it was merely 
loaned to Mickelson (Affidavit of Walters [R. 14]1 
apparently as a demonstrator for Freeway Sales. 
This was the semi-trailer attached in this case by 
the Plaintiffs ( R. 128), now replaced by a cash bond. 
The fact, as shown by the evidence, is that Gin-
dy's agent practiced a fraud on Gindy, its principal 
in presenting a forged order (Ex. 6, No. 3915 and 
R. 129, 136-137). 
The forged Milne order was actually priced out, 
and then semi-trailer was manufactured and sent 
to Salt Lake City (R. 128). And Gindy in turn in-
nocently misrepresented to Plaintiffs that it had 
among its present orders this forged Milne order 
on which the commission would have been at least 
as much as on the Morrison true order (Ex. 6, No. 
3903) approximately $1,000 (R. 114). 
Gindy was also fraudulently imposed upon by 
its agent Freeway Sales regarding the first Inter-
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state Motor Lines order of May 16, 1962, No. 3914 
IR. 136, 7). Apparently this was also priced out be-
~ausc it, like the forged Milne order, supra, had been 
accepted and was discovered to be fictitious in na-
ture by Mr. Ginsburg, owner of Gindy, when he vis-
iterl in Salt Lake City in October, November, or as 
late as December 1962 (R. 134). 
Mr. Ginsburg was here in town and had 
developed the fact that neither the Milne or 
Intel'State trailer ever had actually been or-
dered by the parties that had been represented 
to us as having ordered them ( R. 134). 
Again the commission would have been approxi-
mately $1,000 as on the Morrison trailer (R. 114). 
Defendant claimed that it honestly and inno-
cently misrepresented these two orders as included 
in the orders which were included in the sufficient 
order in to produce more than $17,000 commissions 
(Ex. 1). 
Petty was induced to rely and act innocently 
rm that representation and the promise based upon 
it in Exhibit "l." 
The question is therefore, when one of two in-
nocent persons must lose which one shall be the loser? 
A leading California case answers this question. 
In Burgess v. California Mutual B. and L. 
Assn. (1930) 210 Cal. 180, 290 P.1029, McKellup 
and wife had delivered a deed of trust to defendant 
rm two parcels of property to secure a note of 
$20,000. Later, needing more funds, they secured a 
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letter addressed to them stating that defendants 
would release the deed of trust on the McKellup 
Heights property for the sum of $6,000. McKellup 
showed the letter to plaintiff who loaned $12,0IJIJ 
to McKellup on strength of the letter shown to him. 
McKellup became bankrupt. Defendant refused to 
release its lien for $6,000 offered by Burgess to de-
fendant. Plaintiff sued on promissory estoppel. De-
fendant pleaded no consideration for the promise. 
The supreme court of California reversed for 
plaintiff and held that when one of two innocent 
persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by 
whose affirmative act caused the loss to occur to \hf 
person relying must suffer the loss. 
The foregoing case is cited favorably in an ar· 
ticle "Promissory Estoppel in California," 5 Stan· 
ford Law Review 783, 793, Apr. 1953. The article 
deals only with promissory estoppel as a cause of 
action and does not deal of estoppel as a defense. 
This supreme court has upheld the above prin· 
ciple in Hilton v. Sloan ( 1910 37 Utah 359, 379, 108 
P. 689. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 1941 5th 
ed., Sec. 809, p. 218, points out that the Hilton case 
cites his earlier edition on this point (p. 218 N. 8). 
Pomeroy states the rule that governs in the cas~ of 
mistake of Gindy as to the genuineness of the Milne 
and first Interstate order as follows: 
In such a case the party might not only 
be ignorant or mistaken, but he might ~yep 
believe his own statements to be true. This is 
a plain application of the principle that where 
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one of two innocent persons must suffer, the 
loss will fall upon him whose conduct made 
it possible. 
Other cases supporting the same principle are 
cited by Pomeroy: Jett vs. Crittenden, 89 Ark., 349, 
116 S. W. 665; Stubbs vs. Franklin & M. R. Co., 101 
Me. 355, 64 A. 625. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS 
FINDING NUMBERED 2, THAT PLAINTIFF 
OFFERED NO EVIDENCE OF FALSITY OF DE-
FENDANT'S REPRESENT A TI ON OF PRESENT 
FACTS THAT IT HAD ON HAND "ORDERS" 
TO PRODUCE COMMISSIONS TO FREEWAY 
AND" OR MICKELSON OF MORE THAN $17,000, 
AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
DID NOT MAKE ANY FALSE REPRESENTA-
TION, AND ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE EVIDENCE PROVED SAID REPRESEN-
TATION TO BE ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, BUT 
PRIMARILY FALSE, AND ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT MADE SAID 
PRIMARILY FALSE REPRESENTATION TO 
INDUCE PLAINTIFFS TO LOAN $12,000 TO 
FREEWAY TRAILER SALES, INC. AND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS DID MAKE SAID LOAN IN RE-
LIANCE ON SAID PRIMARILY FALSE REPRE-
SENTATION OF FACT AND INTEGRATED 
PROMISE OF DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAIN-
TIFFS DIRECTLY IN A PRIORITY POSITION 
SAID $17,000, AND ERRED IN NOT GIVING 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR $5,500. 
The facts are that there were only two true 
orders, two fictitious orders, supra, and four "deals 
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in progress" as shown by the chart classifying the 
orders and so-called orders under the heading, "Tht 
Facts About the Orders and the Non-order" DEALS 
IN PROGRESS, supn1. 
The word order has been judicially construed. 
Between the parties it means in this case an offer 
to buy one or more semi-trailers with all of the essen-
tial terms which will become a contract on accept-
ance. Seeding Machine Company vs. Conwnwealt/i, 
152 Kentucky 589, 153 S. W. 972. 
A federal case involving whether the sales agent 
had submitted orders, when he had submitted cus-
tomer's specifications of minimum yardage of cloth 
on which prices had not been fixed held that they 
were not orders - until the price was determined on 
said requests of customers. Freund vs. Hodges Fin-
ishing Company C. C. A., Mass. 14 F. 2d 424. 
Gindy knew the difference between orders to 
be filed later by manufacture and shipment and mere 
"deals in process" not yet ripened into orders, or 
because of the nature of its business such knowledgP 
must surely be imputed to Gindy. 
Let us note again the wording of Section 90 of 
the Restatement of Contracts. Informal Contracts 
Without Assent or Consideration. 
A promise which the promissor should rea· 
sonably expect to induce action or forebear~ 
ance of a definite and substantial charac~ei 
on the part of the promisee and whic~ do.es i~­
duce such action or forebearance is bmdmg if 
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injustice can be avoided only by the enforce-
ment of the promise. 
The need for this doctrine in the half way area 
unween contract and tort is succinctly stated by the 
author of an excellent article in 14 Ill., L. R. 187-
204, at 203, 204, No. 2, June 1941. 
But where a no-bargained for considera-
tion can be spelled out, there has been a need 
for a doctrine capable of preventing a betray-
al of trust and confidence that may be placed 
in a promise, at least to the extent of compen-
sation for injury arising from the change of 
position. (204) 
The article senses the broad underlying prin-
ciple of Section 90 in the following statement: 
The circumstances surrounding non-bar-
gain promises may be entirely different from 
the ordinary contract situation and it is not 
unnatural that different policies should apply 
in measuring the damages. There are promises 
which are made carelessly or breached forget-
fully, causing injury in a manner similar to 
tortious acts of negligence. Promises to insure 
and various other business arrangements are 
illustrative. The factual elements are so var-
iable that it would be better not to categorize 
the principle of promissory estoppel as one 
of "tort" or "contract." The cases citing Sec-
tion 90 indicate that it is a principle measure 
of recovery under a doctrine for the preven-
tion of injustice need not be limited to any 
single formula but should vary with the cir-
cumstances." Ibid. 203. 
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The terminology in this developing area of tht 
law has come under close analysis. 
Professor Corbin prefers to call this relatively 
new action the "reliance doctrine" or "action in r;. 
liance doctrine." See lA Corbin, Contracts, 1963 ed., 
Sec. 200, 204. 
Professor Corbin analyzes the "Limits of the 
Action in Reliance Doctrine" in Sec. 200, from which 
the following quotations are taken: 
First, it can be said with assurance that 
the action or forbearance must amount to a 
substantial change of position. 
Certainly in the instant case the loaning ul 
$12,000 was a substantial change of position. 
Secondly, it can be said with equal assur· 
ance that the action or forbearance must either 
have been actually foreseen by the promisor, 
or must be of such a kind as a reasonable per· 
son in his position would have foreseen when 
making the promise which determined the ex· 
tent and scope of the promise. (Sec. 200, p. 
216.) 
Defendant actually forsaw that Petty woula 
make a substantial loan to Freeway Sales if its tele· 
gram led him to believe that the $17,000 would be 
paid to him from orders in Defendant's hands on 
September 28, 1962. This Defendant admitted ha\'· 
ing forseen a loan to Freeway Sales of $17,000. (R. 
121.) $17,000 includes $12,000. 
Thirdly, a promise must hav~ been ma~: 
and this promise ... must have mduced t 
action ... in reliance on it. 
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The telegram was so worded in its representa-
tion of more than $17,000 commissions coming to 
Freeway when shipments of trailers and collections 
due on such deliveries were made and its tied-in 
promise to give Plaintiffs priority of such payments 
directly that it is beyond a shadow of a reasonable 
doubt that the said representation and coupled prom-
ise did induce the loan of $12,000 to Freeway Sales. 
Professor Corbin introduces the requirement of 
degrees of definiteness of Plaintiff's action, under 
Section 90 as follows : 
All action is definite after it occurs: so, 
the Institute must have meant that the prom-
isor must have had reason to forsee the defi-
nite action or forbearance that in fact fol-
lowed. Without doubt, the more keen and ac-
curate the foresight of the promisor was or 
ought to have been, the stronger i,s the case of 
rnforcement." (Italics added.) 
In this case the promissor saw keenly and ac-
curately that a substantial loan to Freeway Sales 
awaited receipt of its Exhibit 1 telegram. 
The rule constructed by the Law Insti-
tute in section 90 of the Restatement is limited 
to cases in which the action or forbearance 
in reliance is on the part of the promisee. This 
may be as far as it is safe to go on the basis 
of cases already decided. But in new cases, 
the courts need not feel themselves equally re-
stricted. 
Finally, the Restatement justifies en-
forcement of the promise only 'if injustice 
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can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.' This raises the perilous question 
"What is justice, without giving any rules 0; , 
standards for its answer?" Here, too, tht 
courts are accustomed to the peril. But if all 
the other requirements of the stated r~le are 1 
satisfied, does not justice always require en. 
forcement of the promise? So far as the Itt· 
statement itself informs us, the answer is 
Yes." Ibid., Sec. 200. 
From the earlier statement of facts in their 
setting of factual requirements of promissory estop· 
pel and from Professor Corbin's excellent analysis 
of the nature and scope of the legal requirements for ' 
promissory estoppel, Plaintiffs contend that the 
propositions of its Point II are fulfilled. The detaile(I , 
drafting of Exhibit 1, the choice of words used, the 
purpose of their use, the natural result of their use, 
and the circumstances surrounding the meticulous· 
ness with which the telegram, Exhibit 1, was worded 1 
to induce the definite and substantial action which 
followed will be more elaborately analyzed under 
Point V. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
LACK OF PROOF OF FALSITY AND IN RE: 
QUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PROVE F ALSIT
0
1F 
WHICH IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. 
The Court failed to recognize that Plaintiff had 
fully proved the requirements of its action of prom· 
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issory equitable estoppel or "action in reliance" in 
Professor Corbin's phrase under the Restatement of 
Contracts, Section 90, supra. Pomeroy, supra, states 
that fraud is not an essential element of promissory 
estoppel. If proved, it may be an added, but unneces-
sary element in strengthening Plaintiff's position if 
the question of substantial damage for example 
might be in question. 
It is clea1· from a reading of Section 90 of the 
Restatement, supra, that proof of this action is made 
ollt whPn the elements of equitable estoppel are shown 
in Plaintif's favor. 
Nor can Defendant be allowed to prevent Plain-
tiffs recove1·y either by proving his ignorance or 
mistake of trnth or falsity of its representation and 
promise. As pointed out by Professor Corbin supra, 
Plaintiff's case is proved without reference to the 
truth or falsity of the representation. (Sec. 200; 
See also Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 809.) 
If the representation that there were enough 
true orders on hand to produce commissions of 
$17,000 and such commissions failed in part by 
breaches of contract of dissatisfied customers, still 
Defendant would be held to make good its represen-
tation and associated, dependent promise. 
If Defendant claimed that it made a false state-
ment innocently as it did in the supposed-to-be-order 
of Milne Trnck Lines and of the first Interstate 
order still it is held to its representation of fact and 
dependent promise, because of the two innocent par-
ties the reprPsento1· and promisor must make good 
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to the person induced to rely and by relying <liri 
act substantially upon such reliance. 
The estoppel is to prevent Defendant frm: 
cha~ging his position to the injury of the persor 
relymg and acting substantially on such reliance. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIKD 
THAT FREEWAY TRAILER S A LES HAD 
EARNED MORE THAN $9,500 IN COMMJS. 
SIONS BY PERFORMANCE OF FREEWAY'~ 
DUTIES AS A SOLICITING AND SELLIM 
AGENT, AND UNWARRANTED REFUSALBY 
GINDY TO FIRM UP INTO AN ORDER THI 
EARNESTLY PROPOSED DEAL BY PEEBLE 
The foregoing facts and Exhibit 6, No. 3911: 
-the Earl Morrison--0rder shows a true and direc: 
order of August 8, 1962, with the time price an 
percent interest (flat) and a note extending tt11 
price received and accepted by Gindy. According tn 
Walter's testimony Morrison's trailer was manufac· 
tured and shipped as far as Chicago at which poin; 
shipment was stopped by Gindy, November or De· 
cember of 1962 (R. 134). 
The only reason given for the stop shipmen· 
of the Morrison trailer was that Gindy discoYerer, 
that it had been deceived by its agent into belieYini 
that the Milne and first Interstate were valid ordet' 
( R. 134-135). This of course was no excuse for n111 
payment of the commission of $1,000 (R.114) earnec 
by Freeway on the Morrison order. Gindy had earltt! 
checked the credit of Morrison and had accepted thi 
39 
firm order. The comm1ss10n of $1,000 was there-
fore clearly earned and is due to Plaintiffs. 
It is also a principle of the law of agency that 
if the agent presents a customer willing, able, ready 
to buy, and the principal without legal justification 
or real excuse refuses to firm up the deal into an 
order, that then the agent is entitled to his commis-
sion. This the facts show stand true on the Peebles 
so-called order, Exhibit 6, number 3902. The testi-
mony regarding this so-called order is as follows: 
The so-called order by Charles E. Peebles No. 
0902 was originally for three semi-trailers Model 
238 Vr, placed July 18, 1962 (Ex. 6). Mr. Peebles 
was sincere in desiring to secure Gindy trailers. On 
September 6th or 9th by correspondence Peebles in-
dicated he desired to increase the number of trailers 
which he wished to purchase, when financing was 
worked out, from three to six (R. 115-116). 
Gindy took over the effort at arranging for a 
financing of the prospective Peebles purchase. The 
trailers were to be used in the service of Pillsbury 
Mills and the price was to be $15,096.40 each. (R. 
116). The commission to Freeway was to be $6,400 
on each of the six trailers ( R. 116 ( 7-8) prior to in-
stallation of refrigerators in each unit. Each unit 
was priced at $15,096.40 ( R. 117). Freeway's figure 
of $14,600 commission on an order of $90,000 which 
is one-sixth was well in line. This is the commission 
as shown by Exhibit 5, page 2. 
The deal was conditioned on financing of Pee-
bles which Gindy proposed to be done with the Bank 
of America in Los Angeles ( R. 119). 
40 
The bank suggested through Mr. John Becker 
by letter of September 27, l 962, that Cindy pl'oceed 
slowly ( R. 119-120). 
Thereafter, ·w alter's did a thorough check on 
Peebles and he and Ginsburg found Peebles credit to 
be good (R. 126). 
The principal, Gincly delayed and delayed and 
delayed beyond the generous patience of Peebles in 
arranging the financing after Gincly found his credit 
to be good, until January 22, 1963, o\·er six months 
later Peebles wrote Cindy to forget it (R. 119). Pee-
bles cancelled and bought elsewhere ( R. 119-25). 
The evidence shows the Peebles deal to be a cle3r 
breach of the fiduciary duty of Cindy to its agent. 
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. Gindy failed to use rea· 
sonable diligence to protect the interest of its agent. 
Gindy did not excuse its neglect in this Peeble' 
matter because it was too busy in Pennsylvania. lt 
admitted, supra, that on double checking Peebles 
credit was good. Its only explanation is shown by 
Mr. Walters testimony as follows; which is in n11 
respect a sufficient legal excuse for failure to per-
form its duty to arrange financing for Peebles. 
Q. (Mr. Kump) You say that is the re~­
son you turned Peebles down, was the credit 
of Peebles? 
A. No, no. It was the problems he haa 
made he continued without any effort to 
' straighten out. . 
We had financial statements from Pee· 
bles. "\Ve had done a rather complet.e report 
on Peebles. The joint reaction was it was i 
good credit. (R. 126.) 
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The evidence shows that Gindy, a large national 
organization, acted as if it had no duties whatever 
toward Freeway Sales as its soliciting agent. Mr. 
·walters testified that the first Interstate order of 
May 18, 1962, No. 3914 was just left lying around 
until about November and December when Mr. Gins-
burg discovered that it was a fictitious and fraudu-
lent order, and because of that and the allegedly 
forged Milne order, Gindy stopped shipment of the 
Morrison trailer in Chicago (Testimony, supra). 
This tale is very hard to believe. Gindy was ne-
gotiating for about three months prior to the big 
Interstate order of $144,300 secured on September 
Z5, 1962. But there is no contrary testimony in the 
record. 
The evidence compels the conclusion that it was 
Gincly's unwarranted delay, and insistence that Pee-
bles clear up some collateral matter which was no 
business of Gindy's that killed the deal. Freeway 
Sales had found a reliable customer with good credit 
rating, ready, willing and able to purchase six Gin-
dy Trai!Prs. Peebles unjustifiably prevented the 
deal from becoming an order. Is Freeway and Plain-
tiffs in turn entitled to the commission of that trans-
action which had been priced at $152,441, and on 
which Mr. Walters testified the commission would 
have been $24,000? (R. 114.) Agency law says the 
commission is due because failure is attributable 
to the principal Gindy. 
Mechem on Agency, 1914, Vol. 1, Sec. 1535 
writes: 
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Each ~ase rests upon its own peculiar 
facts ?-nd circumstances, and the inquiry in 
every instance must be: 1. What did the agent 
undertake to do? 2. Has he done it and if not 
then, 3. To whose act or to what 'occurrence; 
is the failure to be attributed? ' 
The agent is entitled to the commission if the 
sale is prevented by the principal's fault. Mechem 
Sec. 1533, n.55 citing Tousey v. Etzel, 9 Utah 329: 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, IN ITS 
FINDING NUMBERED 2, THAT DEFENDANT 
DID NOT INTEND OR UNDERTAKE TO DE-
CEIVE THE PLAINTIFFS, AND ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
ACTIVELY CONCEALED FROM PLAINTIFF 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE SO-CALLED 
ORDERS STATED IN EXHIBIT I TO BE IN OR 
PENDING WERE NOT ALL ORDERS BUT 
WERE MAINLY MERELY "DEALS IN PROC· 
ESS" AND INTENDED TO INDUCE PLAIN· 
TIFFS TO RELY AND ACT IN A DEFINITE 
AND SUBSTANTIAL WAY IN EXTENDING 
NEWCREDIT TO DEFENDANT'S AGENT -
FREEWAY TRAILER SALES, INC., ON A ONE· 
F 0 UR TH TRUE AND THREE-FOURTHS 
FALSE REPRESENTATION OF FACT AND ITS 
ACCOMPANYING, DEPENDENT PROMISE TO 
PAY PLAINTIFFS $17,000 OF COMMISSIONS 
IN OR PENDING IN FAVOR OF FREEWAY 
SALES. 
A half truth is the blackest kind of lie. A less 
than half truth deliberately made to induce a third 
party to make a substantial loan to the agent of the 
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representor and promisor that reimbursement of the 
loan will be made to the representee and promisee 
is a fraud of active concealment. 
What is the fraud element in this relatively new 
~oncept of an equity contract "action in Reliance," 
(Professor Corbin's phrase, supra.) which does not 
require a bargained-for consideration and against 
which the Defendant will not be allowed to defend 
on grounds of the statute of frauds or to now assert 
that the facts were different than he represented 
them to be, whether by intent, negligence or mis-
take? 
It surely is a relatively new type of legal animal 
because before Section 90 of the Restatement of 
Contracts and Section 378 of the Restatement of 
Agency representation, reliance and damage were 
the dominant elements of deceit. Consideration and 
meeting of the minds were the dominant elements 
of contract. 
Promissory estoppel, then, is a fraud preven-
tion doctrine. If the elements of a promise (or usual-
ly a promise coupled with a representation of fact) 
be made to - or reasonably can be expected to -
induce a definite type of action by another who acts 
in a substantial manner in relying on the promise 
or on the promise coupled with a representation of 
a material present or past fact, then equity says to 
defendant you will not be allowed to injure or dam-
age the promisee by asserting ignorance or mistake 
of the facts represented or to renig on your promise. 
To allow the Defendant to change or modify 
o1· partly explain away the position he originally 
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took to induce Plaintiff to act would at this time 
allow D:fe_ndant to_ practice presently a fraud upon 
the Plambff. Section 90 removes the requirement 
of scienter necessary for an action of deceit. 
When there is a representation of fact couple(] 
with the promise only three of the elements of the 
ancient catch-as-catch-can action of deceit need he 
proved by Plaintiff to establish this contract: (a) a 
promise or a promise coupled with a represented fact 
or fact representation made to induce or reasonablv 
expected to induce action by another, (b) Relianc~ 
by Plaintiff, (the intent to induce action gives the 
right to rely) and ( c) substantial damage that 11~1! 
occur if Defendant be allowed to plead lack of con· 
sideration, the statute of frauds, or to change the 
position which he originally took to induce, or to 
expect, Plaintiff to change its position. 
These are the three elemets of promissory estop· 
pel found by Dean Benjamin F. Boyer, Dean of Tern· 
pie University Law School in his most extensiw 
research of the adjudicated cases. Promissory Estop· 
pel: Principle from Precedents 50 Mech. L. R. 638· 
7 4 at 644, March 1952. 
Let us fit this new equity contract providing 
for action in reliance for the purpose of fraud pre· 
vention in the ways explained above into the phrase· 
ology of the closing phrase of Section 90 supra: a 
determination that "injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise." 
It was not until 1953 in Ravino v. Pri.ce, m 
Utah 559, 260 P2d 570 that this court repudiated 
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the old hard-to-die doctrine of Elliot v. Whitmore 
(1901) 23 Utah 342, 65 P. 70 which limited the ap-
plication of equitable estoppel to situations where 
there was found an "intention of the promisor to 
abandon an existing right. Equitable estoppel was 
limited to a defense, not allowed as a contract cause 
of action. 
This Court took the step forward under Sec-
tion 90 with much caution. Justice Wolfe, a great 
jurist in taking forward steps in the law could not 
then go along with the application of Section 90 an-
nounced by the California Supreme Court in Sey-
1110111· r. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 of equitable 
enforcement of an oral promise of employment for 
ten years. By dicta this Court declared in 1953 that 
one of the factual requirements by the "action in 
reliance doctrine" must be a false representation 
which need not be intentional or active concealment 
11f a material fact which is to be inferred from ig-
norance or mistake of the representator. Pomeroy, 
.~11pra, Sec. 809. 
Briefly, the Seymour decision, supra, enforced 
an oral promise of employment made by the defend-
ant to plaintiff which defendant agreed to put in 
11Titing by estopping the defendant to assert the 
statute of frauds, when he brought action for dam-
ages upon being discharged after 2 years. 
However, only three years after the Ravino case 
this court found favor with the California supreme 
:omt decision in the Seymour case, supra. by dicta 
m Easton v. Wycoff, ( 1956) 4 Utah 2d 386, 389, 
295 P2d 332. 
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This favor. with the Seynwur case, ::;upra, wa~ 
found. by applymg t?~ test of Section 90 of damage~ 
resultmg from definite and substantial action r 
the prm-r:isee although there was no external misrt;;'. 
resentat10n of fact and no way of proving the prom. 
issor's mind to be bona fide or cagey at the time 
of making the promise. 
This court observed that the detriment suffereu 
by the promisee for the no-bargain promise (con· 
sideration being lacking) was not only "definite anri 
substantial" but under the circumstances was "un-
conscionable." Easton case, 389. 
The analysis of this court is highly probativ: 
In Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra, "plaintiff gaye up a 
lifetime position in order to enter defendant's sen 
ice and worked for him for two years upon the de· 
fendant's promise to put the contract in writing. It: 
this case the court held the defendant es topped tn 
assert the Statute. However, this often cited cme 
might well be contrasted with the case of B.F.C 
Morris Co. v. Mason, 171 Okl. 589, 39 P. 2d m 
likewise involving long-term employment contract 
and a promise to reduce the contract to writing; 
the difference between the cases being that in thr 
latter the plaintiff did not show injury of the type 
sufficient to invoke an estoppel." ( 389.) 
Plaintiff contends that the instant Petty caft 
is governed clearly by the requirements .of _Sect10:1 
90. Present fraud on, and injustice to Plamtiffs can 
be prevented only by estopping ~efendant ~~o.m 11~'.1: 
saying that it only had "deals m progress mstta 
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of orders in or pending on which the itegrated de-
pendent promise was made. 
Testing the facts of this Petty case against the 
requirements of Section 90 we find as follows: 
Defendants expressly drafted Exhibit 1 for the 
known purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to make a sub-
stantial loan to its selling and soliciting agent Free-
way Sales and that Plaintiffs acted and relied there-
on as Defendants had intended. 
It's sheer nonsense to contend that Gindy didn't 
know or was not expected to know the difference 
between "orders in or pending" and "deals in pro-
gress" with prospective customers. The language of 
"assignment," which was the gist of the first tele-
phone conversation on September 28, 1962 by Gin-
dy's admission ( R. 110) is patently lacking from 
Exhibit 1. The telegram bears internal evidence of 
a highly shrewd effort in choice of words. 
The fact is that the offices of Mr. Ginsburg and 
Mr. Walters were next to each other (R. 10). They 
conferred with each other on the day of the two tele-
phone calls. The second telephone call after Mickel-
son "presumably talked with Petty" conveyed the 
idea of the kind of representation which would in-
duce Mr. Petty to rely thereon and to act thereon 
in making a substantial loan to Defendant's agent 
(R.109). 
It is most significant that the telegram does 
not state that Gindy will acknowledge and conform 
to a pending assignment by Mickelson of commis-
sions on deals in progress. The prospective assign-
ment and loan was the language of the first tele-
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phone call. To use the language of assignment Gindr 
concluded would not produce the result which Gindr 
wanted for its agent Freeway Sales. Reference l'· 
any assignment was studiously avoided in drafting 
the telegram, Exhibit 1. 
More pointedly, Exhibit 1 actively conceals 3 ~ 
shrewdly as a crafty drafts man could possibly do thf 
true status of commissions then coming to Freewai. 
Sales and/or Mickelson upon filling orders of whicii 
only Gindy had first-hand, superior, knowledge sine. 
only Gindy was negotiating inquiries of prospectirt 
customers into orders. The very words chosen to in-
duce Plaintiff's action were words used to concta! 
the fact that Gindy did not have the orders whici 
it represented it had. 
Walters testified that he intentionally refraine(I 
from clearly stating what his books showed as dut 
Mickelson (meaning Freeway) because he wanted 
Mr. Petty to rely on the telegram. He didn't want 
Petty to ask questions. 
A. I used the word "order" because the)· 
were ordered. 
Q. No difference to our mind betwee1: 
orders and deals? 
A. I might use the word interchange· 
ably. 
Q. I see. What did you intend by corn· 
missions? . h 
A I used the word commiss10ns; tee · 
nically. in our books it is labeled,, and s1~Jll1' "Distributors Accounts Payable. (A. · 
Q. Why in the telegram didn't you sa:. 
Distributor's Discounts payable? 
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A. Because Mr. Petty probably called 
me up and wanted to know what it was (R. 
145). 
Q. Mr. Walters, you said that if you 
used the term, Distributor's Discounts Pay-
able, instead of commissions, Mr. Petty would 
have called you; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why would he have called you? 
A. I don't know the terminology he 
might use in his general ledger any more than 
he would know what we use in ours. 
Q. When you use a generally accepted 
term used in the industry why would you be 
concerned about this? 
A. Maybe he wouldn't be. You asked me 
why and I answered because it was confusing. 
Q. You said if he was confused he would 
call you. Why would he have called you? 
A. He would have wanted to know what 
is Distributor's Discounts Payable. I would 
have, if someone sprung an unfamiliar term 
on me. (R. 146.) 
This case presents then not only the equitable 
necessity of fraud prevention by estopping Defend-
ant from now changing its position and asserting 
that it had primarily, merely "deals in progress with 
prospective customers," and not orders which would 
bring more than $17,000 in commissions as repre-
sented . 
Plaintiffs contend that the foregoing facts make 
out studied, active concealment by Gindy of the true 
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facts in drafting and sending Exhibit 1 on Septem-
ber 28, 1962, to Petty Investment Company. 
Inju.sti~e of substantial kind will certainly bt 
dealt Plamtiffs unless Defendant be held to its repre-
sentation and integrated promise that it had on 
September 28, 1962 orders which would produ1·p 
more than $17,000 which is the amount it promisell 
to pay to Plaintiff in priority or all other possible 
claimants. 
This Court has aptly said in a case involving 
commissions earned, 
The law will seldom allow a plea of con-
tributory negligence to a deliberate wrong. 
Johnson v. Allen, ( 1945) 108 Utah 148, 1.ii 
p 2d 134. 
While scienter is not required under Section 
90, when scienter is present it makes a stronger ca1e 
for Plaintiff. We respectively submit that the fact1 
make out a case of active concealment of the true 
facts with the purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to rely 
thereon. 
Numerous cases are cited on this rapidly ex-
panding action of promissory estoppel in the anno-
tations of 115 A. L. R. 911 and 48 A. L. R. 2d 106~. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, Plaintiffs conclude: 
1. That Plaintiff's proof of facts in this case 
is ample to establish the factual requirements of an 
action of promissory estoppel according to the re· 
-
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quirements of Section 90 of the Restatement and the 
analyses of the cases by Pomeroy jurisprudence Sec-
tions 805 and 809, supra, and the analyses of Pro-
fessor Corbin on contracts, supra, and of Professor 
Williston to be hereafter mentioned. 
2. That the Court should have found that Plain-
tiffs were entitled to a judgment of $2,000 on the 
innocent misrepresentations of Gindy, that the Milne 
and first Interstate orders were genuine orders when 
in fact they were according to the testimony ficti-
tious orders fraudulently presented to Gindy by 
Freeway Sales. Of the two innocent parties Gindy 
must be the loser. 
3. That Plaintiffs are entitled to commissions 
earned by Freeway Trailer Sales on the true Mor-
rison order of $1,000 and on the Peebles deal in proc-
ess, which was killed by the negligence and inatten-
tion of the principal Gindy in failure of its fiduciary 
duty to work with the financing in duty to its agent 
who had performed its duties by presenting a custo-
mer ready, willing, and able to buy and with good 
credit rating which by ordinary diligence of Gindy 
would have resulted in due financing of the pro-
posed purchase of six trailers, and that the commis-
sion cnrned on the Peebles deal would be more than 
enough to make $4,500 in addition to the earned com-
mis8ion on the Morrison direct order. This makes 
more than $5,500 commissions due Plaintiffs. 
4. That the evidence requires a finding that 
Gindy actively concealed the true state of the orders 
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and the mere "deals in progress" from Plaintiffs 
to induce them to rely on such representation and 
its accompanying, dependent promise of payment 
direct with priority of $17,000 to Plaintiffs and that 
Plaintiffs are out of pocket $8,000 and interests and 
costs on the $12,000 loaned to Freeway Sales at Gin-
dy's inducement. 
5. That the legal requirements and the factual 
requirements of an action of promissory estoppel 
were fully proved and judgment should be given for 
the Plaintiffs in the sum of $5,500. Such judgment 
would fulfill Professor Vlilliston's analysis of the 
duties of a court in this kind of case. 
There would seem, however, compelling 
reasons of justice for enforcing promises, 
where injustice cannot be otherwise avoided, 
when they have led the promisee to incur any 
substantial detriment on the faith of them, 
not only when the promisor intended, but also 
when he should reasonably have expected su~h 
detriment would be incurred, though he did 
not request it as an exchange for his promise. 
Williston Contracts, Revised Ed., 1936, 
Volume 1, Section 139 p. 502. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. LAD RU JENSEN and 
RICHARDS, BIRD and 
HART 
716 Newhouse Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs· 
Appellants 
